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Scott Silliman
his first panel will address the overall applicability of the law of armed
conflict, also called international humanitarian law, to the NATO op-
eration in Kosovo. We are also going to be focusing on several specific issues
that arose during that campaign, one being the legal status of the three Army
soldiers who were captured while on a routine mission near the border. As you
recall, immediately after they were captured, our State Department an-
nounced to the press that the three were “illegal detainees” and many of
us—and several are here at this conference—responded vehemently that they
were clearly prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, and that to
consider them otherwise was to denude them of the protections afforded them
under international law.
I’d like to lay a foundation by reading from a portion of the very controver-
sial Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia1
on this linkage between the jus ad bellum, which is a very large debate as all of
you know, and the more particular jus in bello, which is the focus of this collo-
quium. It reads:
32. The precise linkage between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is not completely
resolved. . . . [I]n the 1950’s there was a debate concerning whether UN
authorized forces were required to comply with the jus in bello as they
represented the good side in a battle between good and evil. This debate died
out as the participants realized that a certain crude reciprocity was essential if
the law was to have any positive impact. An argument that the ‘bad’ side had to
1. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
comply with the law while the ‘good’ side could violate it at will would be most
unlikely to reduce human suffering in conflict.
33. More recently, a refined approach to the linkage issue has been advocated by
certain law of war scholars. Using their approach, assuming that the only lawful
basis for recourse to force is self defence, each use of force during a conflict must
be measured by whether or not it complies with the jus in bello and by whether or
not it complies with the necessity and proportionality requirements of self
defence. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not adequately address
what should be done when it is unclear who is acting in self defence and it does
not clarify the obligations of the ‘bad’ side.2
The Report to the Prosecutor went on to say that the Committee deliber-
ately refrained from assessing jus ad bellum issues and focused exclusively on
whether violations of the law of war occurred within the confines of the jus in
bello. It concluded that there was no basis for further investigation and no ba-
sis whatsoever for the referral of war crimes charges against any of the NATO
combatants.
With regard to the question of linkage between the jus ad bellum and the jus
in bello, though, there seems to be no ambiguity in the United States position.
If there is an armed conflict, whether deemed just or unjust, right or wrong
under the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello applies equally to both sides. That’s the
position I personally take, but I know that many will disagree with that.
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